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This thesis examines the impact of Russian organized crime on the national 
security of the United States.  It begins by defining why Russian organized 
crime should be of concern to U.S. policymakers addressing the effects of 
Russian organized crime on the U.S. economy, national security, and domestic 
law enforcement.  The thesis then analyzes the evolution of Russian organized 
crime from its emergence during the Soviet Union, through its growth during 
privatization, to its structural transformation in the modern era.  This analysis 
establishes the fundamental principles of any potential U.S. policy on Russian 
organized crime and prompts several policy recommendations for the local, 
national, and international levels.  
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Preface 
The desire to conduct an honors thesis came at the end of my 
sophomore year.  After spending two years studying what professors wanted 
me to learn, I decided it was time to focus on a subject of my own choosing.  I 
knew I wanted to do something exciting, something that could keep my 
interest through two years of research and writing.  I had no idea what I 
wanted to do, and casually thought about topics over the summer.  Really, I 
thought the perfect thesis might strike me in a brilliant moment of revelation.  
Not surprisingly, divine intervention failed to supply a topic by the start of my 
junior year.  Thus, I entered my first thesis seminar class no closer to knowing 
what I wanted to write. 
    I decided that I needed to modify my strategy and settled on 
becoming an academic leech.  I attended my honors seminar class, listened to 
my classmates’ thesis ideas, and hoped to find guidance from their creativity.  
The first day of class I sat attentively with notebook in hand, ready to record 
my classmates’ pearls of wisdom.  As we went around the room, I was 
consistently disappointed with their ideas and began thinking of ways to 
transfer into a seminar with students who could satisfy my parasitical needs.  I 
wasn’t disappointed with my classmates’ intelligence, they were plenty smart; 
I was disappointed with their lack of vision.  One history major wanted to 
demonstrate how modern boxing is similar to the gladiatorial games of ancient 
Rome.  Who cares?  Not I.  A policy studies major wanted to write her thesis 
on the activities of the Franciscan nuns of Syracuse and how Syracuse 
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University students could become involved in the sisters’ community service 
projects.  I considered suggesting that she simply ask one of the nuns how to 
become involved and avoid two years of research.  From that point, I decided 
my thesis would be exciting, sexy, perhaps even dangerous.   
The second week of class we again went around the room and 
described how our thesis ideas were evolving.  My idea has a fairly static state 
rate of development—from nothing into nothing.  However, as I faked interest 
in a psychology major’s plan to conduct a survey on the sleep habits of 20-25 
year olds, it suddenly came to me, that elusive spark of inspiration.  My thesis 
would be: international organized crime.  It was exciting, it was sexy (picture 
Steve McQueen in the original Thomas Crown Affair), and it could be 
potentially dangerous, should I decide to interview Bulgarian smugglers and 
Nigerian drug runners in shady Berlin nightclubs.  I firmly intended to do.  I 
immediately knew that international organized crime was too broad of a topic 
and began considering ways to focus it.  I pondered the most notorious 
international criminals.  Who was the best at being bad?  Answer: the 
Russians!  Every spy thriller, every cop movie, features an obligatory Russian 
mobster as an essential member of the villain’s inner circle.  Russian 
organized crime was a perfect topic (although, I quickly learned, “there’s no 
such thing” as the Russian Mafia). 
In the fall of 2003 I researched summer internships while 
simultaneously deciding upon a thesis topic.  I looked into several NGOs and 
government agencies but was drawn to one in particular—the U.S. 
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Department of State.  If I wanted a career in international relations, the State 
Department was the place to be.  While there, I would have the opportunity to 
live in Washington, D.C., socialize with Colin Powell, and potentially go 
overseas.  The application required that you list three bureaus in which you 
would like to work at the State Department.  My preference was the 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau (INL), an organization 
that I knew little about, but which sounded perfect for my thesis. 
While I waited at Syracuse University to hear from the State 
Department (waiting is a job qualification for government work), I had to 
decide what graduate courses I would take to fulfill my requirement of two 
thesis-relevant graduate classes.  I fought to get into a very popular class, 
aptly named “Drugs and Thugs,” taught by a former American Ambassador to 
Brazil and Bulgaria, for the spring of 2004 but was unsuccessful.  The closest 
class I could find remotely related to international organized crime was a new 
interdisciplinary course titled “Perspectives on Terrorism.”  Although I 
enrolled in it on a whim, “Perspectives on Terrorism” became the most 
meaningful class of my college career.  It would greatly shape my thinking 
about how organized crime and terrorism are intimately related to one another.   
Two weeks into the spring semester I got a call from my mother, 
saying a letter had arrived from the State Department.  It was January 31st, 
dangerously close to the acceptance deadline.  I naturally assumed that some 
bitter bureaucrat had decided to send my rejection letter early.  To my 
surprise, I was selected to intern at the State Department and would work in 
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INL.  When I arrived at INL in the summer of 2004 I was put on the most 
understaffed and politically pressing portfolio, counternarcotics in 
Afghanistan.  Because our office was so shorthanded and the needs were so 
great, I was given greater responsibilities than the other interns I occasionally 
interacted with and was treated as an equal among the program officers in the 
building.   
Over ten weeks I became well versed on all topics related to opium 
cultivation and the effects of the narcotics trade on Afghan security and 
stability.  I learned how opium is like a cancer that has irrecoverably wormed 
its way into every aspect of the Afghan state—the conflict with remnants of 
the Taliban, the conflict with power hungry warlords in the provinces, 
agriculture, the economy, terrorism—nothing was left untouched.  As I 
conducted my research on Russian organized crime (ROC) I noticed striking 
similarities between it and Afghanistan.  ROC, I would come to realize, is just 
as insidiously pervasive as Afghan opium.  This knowledge would greatly 
impact my opinion on the urgency of the ROC threat and how the 
international community should address ROC.  My experience with having to 
define specific goals in briefings before State Department officials helped me 
narrow down my thesis topic to: the impact of Russian organized crime on 
U.S. national security. 
Throughout the summer of 2004 and into the fall of my senior year, I 
researched.  In the fall, I selected my second graduate course for the spring of 
2005, an anthropology class titled “Transformations of Eastern Europe.”  
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“Transformations of Eastern Europe” was a class about the impact of the 
collapse of communism during the demise of the Soviet Union and the 
introduction of democracy and capitalism on ordinary people living in the 
Newly Independent States (NIS).  While taking this class, I realized the degree 
to which socialism and the Soviet state influenced the formation of modern 
ROC and decided to examine the differences between ROC before December 
1991 and ROC after December 1991.  Examining the root causes of ROC 
helped me decide on the types of solutions I should recommend.   
I have spent nearly two years on this topic and am officially done with 
my honors thesis, but I feel as if I have only scratched the surface of the 
implications of ROC on U.S. national security and what policies should be 
pursued by the U.S. government to address this threat.  I am amazed at the 
wealth of information I have been able to find on ROC and even more stunned 
on the lack of a comprehensive strategy to contain ROC and protect American 
interests.  There has been plenty of research into ROC but very little effort at 
merging this research in a comprehensive policy proposal.  I believe that those 
who need to be most concerned about ROC are policymakers in the U.S. 
government, not just academics.  
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I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia.   
It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery of enigma. 
-Winston Churchill1 
The nature of organized crime in the contemporary world cannot be 
understood separately from the concept of globalization 
- The United Nations.2 
The Problem  
The defining feature of globalization is the increasing 
interconnectedness and interdependence of organizations and individuals that 
previously had little contact or influence on one another.  Globalization has 
freed the individual from the limitations of his physical location allowing him 
to connect with others across the globe instantaneously.  Along with 
increasing connectivity comes increasing interdependence.  The life of the 
individual is bound to the lives of other people and societies in the farthest 
corners of the world.  Modern organized crime, like the individual, is both 
freed from the limitations of physical location and is significantly affected by 
global phenomena that previously had little impact. 
Unfortunately, international organized crime thrives under these new 
conditions, while governments, in typical bureaucratic fashion, have yet to 
                                                          
1
 “U.S. Representative Jim Leach (R-IA) Holds Hearing on the [sic] Russian Corruption.” 
FDCH Political Transcripts 21 Sept. 1999. 07 April 2005 <http://web.lexis-
nexis.com/universe>. 
2
 United Nations. Office on Drugs and Crime. Global Programme [sic] Against Transnational 
Organized Crime. Results of a Pilot Survey of Forty Selected Organized Criminal Groups in 
Sixteen Countries. 2002. 9 Oct. 2004 
<http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/publications/Pilot_survey.pdf>., p. 2 
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adapt.  There is a significant threat in states with weak government that 
powerful organized crime groups will usurp the authority of elected officials 
and establish a kleptocracy.  The government of Russia is very vulnerable to 
such an attack and has already been infiltrated at every level of governance by 
corrupt officials with ties to organized crime.  In a globalized world, 
instability in Russia leads to insecurity in the United States.  Thus it is in the 
self-interest of the United States government to take action to contain the 
spread and influence of organized crime.   
A Russian organized crime (ROC) group is a structured group of three 
or more people from the former Soviet Union who commit a serious crime(s) 
in order to obtain material gain.3  The former Soviet Union includes the states 
of: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and 
Uzbekistan.  Organized crime groups based in the defunct Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (COMECON) states—Albania, Bulgaria, Cuba, 
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the 
Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia—are sometimes included under the title of 
Russian organized crime.  In this paper I will focus primarily on organized 
crime groups originating in Russia and will use case studies of Armenian and 
Balkan organized crime.    
 ROC threatens the stability of the Russian Federation and challenges 
the legitimacy of the government by corrupting existing state institutions and 
filling the vacuum left by a government lacking the economic resources, legal 
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and physical infrastructure, and personnel to fulfill its duties.  Justice and law 
enforcement officials are understaffed, underpaid, and underfunded and are, 
thus, ripe for corruption and bribery.4  Laws exist but they are not enforced 
and are riddled with deficiencies from a legal system inherited from Russia’s 
Soviet past.5  The Russian Far East (RFE), labeled the most crisis-ridden 
district in Russia by President Vladimir Putin, is a perfect example of the 
breakdown of law and order.  According to a 2001 Drug Enforcement Agency 
(DEA) intelligence report, there are over 149 organized crime groups 
operating in the RFE, 40 of which have international connections.  Legitimate 
businesses shipping out of the ports of Nakhodka and Vladivostok (a.k.a. the 
“Wild East”), Russia’s largest ports on the Pacific, have to pay protection 
taxes to ROC or their shipments will be halted.  Corrupt and intimidated local 
officials restrict use of the ports to those businesses owned by local 
politicians, oligarchs, or ROC (usually one in the same).6   
Regional governments like the RFE are puppets controlled by Russian 
organized crime.  Political parties depend on the financial support of ROC to 
survive, state officials are easily bought, and ROC even elects its own 
candidates to political office.  For example, in the summer of 2004, Vladimir 
Nikolayev, an entrepreneur with significant ties to organized crime, reached 
the second round of the Vladivostok mayoral election with less that 3% of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
3
 Ibid., p. 5 
4
 United States. Cong. House. Committee on International Relations. The Threat from Russian 
Organized Crime. 104th Cong., 2nd sess. Washington: GPO, 1996., p. 5 
5
 Finckenauer, James O., and Yuri A. Voronin. National Institute of Justice. “The Threat of 
Russian Organized Crime.” Issues in International Crime.  2001. 10 Oct. 2004 
<http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/187085.pdf>., p. 23 
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vote following a series of illegal political maneuverings.  One of his 
opponents, Viktor Cherepkov, a State Duma Deputy and former Vladivostok 
mayor, was disqualified from the second round of elections for missing a 
session of the Leninskiy Rayon Court without cause, even though he was 
being hospitalized during the session for wounds incurred in an assassination 
attempt.  Two other opponents withdrew their candidacy and encouraged 
voters to stay away from the poles as a statement of resistance to the rigged 
election.7   
Unfortunately for regions like the RFE, criminals make terrible 
stewards of the public welfare.  ROC groups use their political influence to 
push domestic and foreign policies that promote the interests of ROC, not the 
interests of the people.  Legitimate government, the natural protector of the 
people, has done little to ingratiate itself to the public and generate a moral 
opposition to organized crime.  Under communism, the Soviet bureaucracy 
was so corrupt that a profession in crime was seen as more honorable and less 
hypocritical than a profession in government. 8  ROC groups often fund the 
repair of schools and hospitals, establish charities, provide security to 
businesses and individuals, and sponsor sporting events to win the support of 
a populace disillusioned with the inability of government to provide for even 
their basic needs.  For example, residents of Nizhni Tagil, located in the Ural 
mountains, protested the arrest of the city’s top ROC leader and demanded his 
                                                                                                                                                       
6
 Drug Enforcement Agency. Drug Intelligence Brief: Heroin Trafficking in Russia’s 
Troubled East. 2003. 29 Jan. 2005 <http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/intel/03053/03053.html>. 
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release because the mobster was a firm supporter of the disabled, senior 
citizens, and the local soccer team, all of whom had been neglected by the city 
government.9 
The national security of the United States is threatened by a state wiht 
the second largest nuclear arsenal in the world, tremendous amounts of natural 
resources, and a government dominated by criminal interests.  According to 
Finckenauer and Voronin, “As the transnational [organized crime] groups 
accumulate money, power, and influence, government agencies charged with 
combating them are actually declining in capacity and effectiveness.”10  ROC 
has penetrated every level of the Russian government and the legitimate 
sectors of the economy to a degree where outside intervention is necessary to 
reestablish law and order.  It is in the interest of the United States to lead an 
international effort at eliminating the cancerous invasion of ROC.11 
This thesis first describes how the United States’ economy, national 
security, and domestic law and order are threatened by ROC and why the U.S. 
has a responsibility to correct a situation that American policymakers helped 
create.  An analysis of the evolution of ROC from Stalin to the present day is 
presented after this description.  The analysis includes the emergence of the 
vory v zakonye, Russia’s traditional Mafia, in the Soviet gulags; the 
transformation of the internal and external structures of ROC groups under the 
                                                                                                                                                       
7
 Verba, Igor and Sergey Sergiyevskiy. “The Most Democratic Democracy.  Candidate Who 
Did Not Even Garner 3 Percent of Vote in First Round Reaches Final of Vladivostok Mayoral 
Election.” Moscow Nezavisimaya Gazeta 15 July 2004: 1, 2. 
8
 Finckenauer, James O., and Yuri A. Voronin. (note 5), p. 8, 11, 24 
9
 Ibid., p. 7, 25 
10
 Ibid., p. 30 
11
 Ibid., p. 30 
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forces of privatization and globalization; and an overview of future ROC 
trends.  Based on this analysis, the thesis develops several fundamental 
principles that should be present in any potential U.S. policy on Russian 
organized crime and recommends several solutions at the local, national, and 
international levels.      
 
Why Should the United States be Concerned About 
Russian Organized Crime? 
Economic Concerns 
Allowing Russia to disintegrate into a kleptocracy would have 
enormous negative effects on the U.S. economy.  There are four components 
to the damage of ROC on U.S. economic interests: the compromise of U.S. 
domestic financial security, the misuse of international financial aid, a 
decrease in American foreign direct investment in Russia, and the 
establishment of barriers to accessing Russia’s natural resources.   
Jim Moody, former deputy assistant director of the FBI’s Criminal 
Investigation Division, testified before Congress that the biggest ROC threat 
to the United States is the investment of billions of dollars generated from 
crime and corruption in the U.S. financial market.12  Contrary to popular 
belief, the bulk of ROC profits do not remain in offshore tax havens in Cyprus 
and the Caribbean.  Rather, they are deposited and invested in the United 
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States, the safest, the largest, and the most profitable investment climate in the 
world.13  Illegal profits are laundered and invested in the purchase of 
companies, the establishment of companies, and stock market portfolios.  
According to Moody, in his experience as an organized crime investigator, a 
criminal that purchases or establishes a legitimate business will always utilize 
illegal business practices once he controls the enterprise.14  The theft of 
international financial aid to Russia is an excellent example of the perversion 
of the legitimate financial sector in the West by oligarchs, corrupt officials, 
and ROC.  
The United States is the primary contributor to international financial 
institutions and Russia is one of the largest consumers of international aid.  
According to Congress, at least thirty percent of American aid to Russia has 
been stolen and transferred to countries with secure investment climates.15  
The most notorious case of stolen aid money is the Bank of New York 
scandal.  In August of 1999, the Bank of New York was implicated in a 
money laundering investigation of $10 billion, $200 million of which came 
from International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans to Russia.16 Investigators soon 
realized that the Bank of New York was only the tip of the iceberg.  The IMF 
loaned Russia, as part of a larger aid package, $4.5 billion during the financial 
                                                                                                                                                       
12
 “Panel II of a Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.” Federal News Service 
23 Sept. 1999. 07 April 2005 <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe>., p. 3 
13
 “Testimony September 23, 1999 Fritz W. Ermarth Former CIA and NSC Orfficial [sic] 
Senate Foreign Relations Corruption in Russia.” Federal Document Clearing House 
Congressional Testimony 23 Sept. 1999. 07 April 2005 <http://web.lexis-
nexis.com/universe>., p. 3 
14
 “Panel II of a Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.” (note 12) 
15
 “U.S. Representative Jim Leach...” (note 1), p. 10 
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crisis of August 1999 when the ruble plummeted.  The Russian Central Bank 
used $3 billion of the $4.5 billion to buy rubles from and sell dollars to 
Russian commercial banks.  These banks were owned or controlled by 
oligarchs and organized criminals who then laundered the IMF proceeds in 
financial institutions around the world, including the Bank of New York.17  
American aid is American tax dollars.  The theft of American aid is an attack 
on U.S. economic security and jeopardizes U.S. foreign policy.  
The gamut of financial crimes committed within and against the 
United States by ROC is not limited to money laundering.  ROC groups in the 
U.S. are unique among other ethnically defined organized crime groups like 
La Cosa Nostra in that ROC groups incline towards sophisticated white-collar 
crimes at an early stage.  According to Finckenauer and Voronin, these crimes 
include bankruptcy scams, cybercrime, “healthcare fraud, insurance scams, 
stock frauds, antiquities swindles, forgery and fuel tax evasion schemes.”18  
ROC employs professionals in the legitimate sectors of the economy, 
who may or may not know that they are colluding with organized crime, 
essentially blurring the line between legal and illegal activities.  The more 
deeply ROC infiltrates the legitimate economy, the more difficult it is to 
extricate it.19  The long-term consequence of ROC infiltration into the 
legitimate private sector is the irrevocable corruption of the American 
economy.  Russia itself is testimony to the horrible effects of criminal 
                                                                                                                                                       
16
 “Crime without Punishment.” The Economist 28 Aug. 1999. 13 July 2004 
<http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe>., p. 1 
17
 “Panel II of a Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.” (notes 12, 14) 
18
 Finckenauer, James O., and Yuri A. Voronin. (notes 5, 8-11), p. 26 
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involvement in private industry: capital flight, disillusionment with 
democracy and capitalism, and the popular destigmitization of crime.  This 
paper will address this issue further in an examination of the political-criminal 
nexus. 
ROC has an impact not only on business interests within the United 
States but also on multinational corporations owned and operated by 
American firms.  Crime and corruption create an environment in Russia 
unfavorable to U.S. business interests.  Businesses simply find it more 
expensive and less lucrative to operate in an environment where their physical 
and financial security are threatened.  Yekaterinburg, one of the most crime 
ridden cities in the Ural Mountains, is a case in point.  ROC is so powerful in 
Yekaterinburg that it has forced out, frightened off, or taken over most of the 
legitimate businesses in the region.  Those businesses that remain must hire 
personal security for company executives to protect them from contract 
killings, assaults, and kidnappings.20  Dealing with corrupt officials is a 
necessary part of doing business in Russia, from paying a parking ticket to 
obtaining a business license.  However, American firms do not factor bribery 
into their annual budgets, thus making Russia a very expensive place to do 
business.  Corruption also inhibits fair competition.  It is more difficult for an 
American company with no established connections with state officials, to 
                                                                                                                                                       
19
 Ibid., p. 27 
20
 Ibid., p. 20 
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compete with a Russian company who previously purchased the patronage of 
those officials.21  
The U.S., along with the rest of the industrial world, has an insatiable 
need for energy and raw materials.  The wide expanse of Russia is rich with 
oil fields, gas fields, and mineral deposits that could satisfy American energy 
needs and provide much needed income to the Russian state.  However, ROC 
has a monopoly on the extraction of Russia’s natural resources.  ROC groups 
steal natural resources and sell them abroad through established networks 
depriving the state of export income and drawing down world prices.22  If 
Russia were able to trade its natural resources in the legitimate economy, the 
U.S. would not have to rely on oil and gas from the Middle East and other 
contentious areas of the world.  Whether or not oil was the primary reason for 
the U.S. invasion of Iraq can be contested, oil was certainly a factor in U.S. 
military operations once the invasion commenced.  American national security 
would not have to be compromised by the need for energy and raw materials 
if Russia’s wealth of natural resources were released from the grip of ROC.   
 
National Security Concerns  
 The goal of a terrorist group is to obtain a political or ideological 
agenda through violence.  The goal of an organized crime group is to gain 
wealth by breaking the law.  However, the mechanisms by which these two 
groups go about obtaining their goals—the strategies, the resources, even the 
                                                          
21
 United States. Cong. House. Committee on International Relations. (note 4), p. 48  
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personnel—are very similar.23  Thus, the battle against organized crime should 
be given greater political priority as an element in the War on Terrorism.  The 
mechanisms shared by organized crime and terrorism include but are not 
limited to narcotics, money laundering, human trafficking, and arms 
trafficking.   
Narcotics trafficking is used by terrorist organizations to finance their 
operations.  The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which has close 
financial and organizational ties to al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, traffics 
heroin from Central Asia, through Russia, and into Western Europe to finance 
its activities.24  With little experience in trafficking and distributing heroin to 
markets where there is significant demand, i.e. Western Europe, it is only 
natural to assume that the IMU and similar organizations would need to 
collaborate with existing organized crime groups that specialize in narcotics.  
Money laundering is an essential part to terrorist financing for the same reason 
that it is essential to the execution of crimes.  In order to interact with the 
legitimate economy, to buy an airplane ticket or flying lessons in the case of 
al-Qaeda, the illegal source of the money must be hidden.  Human trafficking 
is relevant to terrorist organizations because methods for smuggling illegal 
aliens and victims of the sex trade across borders can be exploited to smuggle 
terrorist operatives.   
                                                                                                                                                       
22
 Finckenauer, James O., and Yuri A. Voronin. (notes 5, 8-11, 18-20) 
23
 Finckenauer, James O. “NIJ International Center Director Makes Presentation on Russian 
Organized Crime at State Department.” Department of State. 15 Oct. 2001. 24 July 2003 
<http://www.ojp.gov/nij/international/audio/remarks.txt>. 
24
 United States.  Federal Research Division. Involvement of Russian Organized Crime 
Syndicates,Criminal Elements in the Russian Military, and Regional Terrorist Groups in 
 17 
U.S. policy makers are most concerned about organized crime’s 
involvement in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).  
According to U.S. Army General Montgomery Meigs (Ret.), former 
commander of the 39-nation Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
organized crime has, on occasion, provided terrorists and insurgents with the 
materials and equipment to manufacture dirty bombs and biological 
weapons.25  In the past fifteen years, according to the National Intelligence 
Council, the Russian authorities thwarted two attempts by terrorists to break 
into nuclear weapons storage sites and have documented three successful 
thefts (there are suspicions that undocumented thefts have occurred) of 
nuclear materials from Russian nuclear facilities.26   
Both organized crime and terrorism endanger U.S. military operations, 
particularly operations where the military is tasked to combat an insurgency 
supported by terrorist and criminal elements.  The three most pertinent 
examples of this phenomenon are Afghanistan, the Middle East, and the 
Balkans.  Afghanistan dominates the global opium trade and threatens to turn 
Afghanistan into a narco-state ruled by warlords.  ROC involvement in the 
Afghan opium trade threatens our mission of bringing stability and legitimacy 
to the government of President Hamid Karzai.27  ROC has found it very 
lucrative to participate in weapons proliferation in the Middle East, making it 
                                                                                                                                                       
Narcotics Trafficking in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Chechnya. Washington: Library of 
Congress, 2002. 
25
 Meigs, Montgomery C. Personal interview. 15 Feb. 2005. 
26
 United States. National Intelligence Council. Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and 
Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces. 2004. 20 March 2005 
<http://www.cia.gov/nic/special_russiannuke04.html>. 
27
 Finckenauer, James O., and Yuri A. Voronin. (notes 5, 8-11, 18-20, 22) 
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more dangerous and more difficult for our troops to combat insurgents.28  
Organized crime is aiding and abiding paramilitaries in Bosnia forcing U.S. 
forces to engage in law enforcement as well as peacekeeping operations.29  
The Balkans are a perfect case study of how organized crime can make it very  
difficult to avoid mission creep.   
Terrorist organizations, organized crime, paramilitaries, and corrupt 
government officials are all part of a global network of informal deal 
structures.  They trade favors on an ad hoc basis with the understanding that 
the return of a favor can be called upon in the future.  According to General 
Meigs, it was fairly common in Bosnia to see paramilitary police (the 
equivalent of state police in the U.S.) patrolling a warehouse filled with 
contraband—stolen cigarettes, alcohol, luxury clothes—for an organized 
crime group in exchange for cash or a favor.30  The American equivalent 
would be if the Texas Rangers were to escort a shipment of cocaine over the 
Mexican border in exchange for a cut of the profits.   
Patrolling a contraband warehouse may seem like a fairly minor 
infraction by a few soldiers with shady business connections, but without the 
support of organized crime financing and personnel, the American military 
would face a weaker and more vulnerable enemy.  Take the case of Arkan 
(real name Zeljko Raznatovic), a notorious organized crime leader linked to 
the government of Slobodan Milosevic and the founder an ultra-nationalist 
Serb paramilitary force known as the Tigers.   
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Arkan was a bank robber before the Yugoslavian state security hired 
him as a hit man to assassinate Yugoslavian expatriates who were 
troublesome to the Milosevic administration.  Once he established the Tigers, 
Arkan united his criminal endeavors with his military goals.  Wherever the 
Tigers went, they established a petrol smuggling concession and stole cash 
and jewlery from Muslim refugees.  He also purchased the Red Star Belgrade 
soccer club, an all too common example of organized crime’s infiltration into 
Eastern European professional sports.  Some of the proceeds from organized 
crime were used to support the military operations of the Tigers while the rest 
lined pockets.31  An American military unit assigned to combat the Tigers 
would have had to address the issue of organized crime in order to cut off 
Arkan’s base of financial support and prevent the plundering of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The American military faces a new type of enemy with 
inadequate resources.  The military is not trained in or expected to carry out 
law enforcement operations, but in the world of irregular warfare where 
criminals and combatants are less and less distinguishable, organized crime is 
a significant threat to America’s armed forces.           
 
Domestic Crime and Corruption Concerns 
Russian organized crime is very similar to the communist threat of the 
Cold War, in order to keep ROC outside of U.S. borders, U.S. law 
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enforcement agencies must engage ROC overseas.  As stated earlier, once 
ROC infiltrates the legitimate American economy it spreads like a cancer 
throughout the financial sector and government decreasing law enforcement’s 
ability to extricate ROC exponentially.  Criminals from the former Soviet 
Union are the most highly educated of any ethnically-based criminal 
organization and present a threat that modern law enforcement has never 
encountered.32     
ROC groups in the U.S. are very different from their counterparts in 
Russia and other ethnically-based organized crime groups in the U.S.  The 
internal structure of America’s ROC groups have evolved from a vertical 
Mafia hierarchy to horizontal networks due to successful efforts by law 
enforcement at combating Mafia hierarchies.  ROC networks are composed of 
individuals chosen for their expertise in a certain criminal skill who come 
together on an ad hoc basis for perpetration of a specific crime or series of 
crimes and dissolve once the act is completed.  ROC members are often bound 
by social ties that ensure loyalty to the group.  They may have grown up 
together in the same tight-knit community; they are friends and relatives.33  
Local and federal law enforcement are not currently equipped to meet 
the challenge of sophisticated criminal networks.  Techniques that have been 
successful in breaking up La Cosa Nostra, such as wiretaps and informants, 
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take time to develop and are not effective against a constantly shifting target.34  
The technology and experts employed in law enforcement investigations are 
inferior to those utilized by ROC.  ROC members are among the most 
sophisticated and educated criminals in the world.  They recruit from a surplus 
of unemployed, highly trained technical experts in the former Soviet Union 
who are disillusioned with democracy and capitalism and are willing to work 
for the highest bidder.35  Organized crime law enforcement units are 
understaffed and underfunded because of the priority placed on 
counterterrorism.36  There is a lack of political recognition that the fight 
against organized crime is part of the War on Terror and that resources need to 
be expended in order to contain ROC.   
The political will to combat ROC will decline further under the 
encouragement of local and federal officials in the U.S. government who 
benefit from the existence of ROC.  There is evidence that ROC has corrupted 
some government officials, though an official does not have to be in full 
partnership with ROC in order to be affected by it.37  For example, former 
Vice President Al Gore had a professional and personal relationship with 
Viktor Chernomyrdin, former prime minister of Russia.  When the CIA sent a 
report to Gore revealing Chernomyrdin’s involvement in criminal activities, 
the Vice President sent the report back with a “barnyard epithet” written 
across the front.  From the on, lower level administrators in the CIA blocked 
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unfavorable intelligence on Chernomyrdin and Russian crime and corruption, 
denying the Vice President of information detailing the severity of ROC.38  
While the Clinton administration’s influence on ROC intelligence was not as 
severe as the mishandling of intelligence on Iraq, both demonstrate how a 
threat can be understated or overstated because of personal bias.  
The threat of ROC should not be understated.  Like terrorist 
organizations, ROC groups in the U.S. are part of a large international 
criminal network that provides seemingly infinite resources and escape routes 
to countries with no extradition treaties with the United States.39  According to 
the 2002 DEA Intelligence Brief, ROC has found a niche in this international 
criminal network transporting cocaine from Latin America to Western Europe, 
Russia, and the United States.40  ROC support of Latin American drug cartels 
undermines the ability of U.S. law enforcement to fight the War on Drugs and 
increases the resources of paramilitary groups in Colombia.41 
  
Social Responsibility 
Russia required a great deal of international assistance after the fall of 
the Soviet Union and looked to the West for financial and moral support in 
transforming a country based on 74 years of communism into a vibrant 
capitalist economy.  The Russians thought of America as a model of 
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democracy.  They put their faith in “American experts” who went to Russia to 
assist in the transformation.  The U.S. government offered very generous sums 
of financial aid and expert assistance to Russia but insisted on the acceptance 
of “shock therapy” as a condition of aid.  “Shock therapy” was the theory of 
privatization by any means.  U.S. policymakers were not concerned with who 
came into control of state assets—high-level officials in the Party, the 
nomenklatura, or professional criminals—as long as those assets were 
privately owned.  The belief was that democratic institutions and the rule of 
law would naturally develop once a capitalist economy was established.42   
Predictably, “shock therapy” was a disaster.  Wayne Merry, a former 
State Department official, stated in his Congressional testimony, “Our policy 
quite literally gave precedence in our Russian policy [sic] to the concept 
‘greed is good’ over the concept of ‘due process of law.’  And in the process, 
we created incentives for the very public theft and capital flight that we now 
deplore.”43  A majority of Russians blame the West, particularly the U.S., for 
Russia’s current state of rampant crime and corruption and feel betrayed for 
having been misled.44  The Russian people are ultimately responsible for the 
fate of their country, but the United States has a responsibility to assist them 
in combating a scourge of criminality that America has helped to create. 
U.S. policymakers should take measures to combat ROC out of a 
desire to reduce the pain and suffering of victims of ROC, in addition to a 
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sense of historical responsibility.  The current ROC generation is 
exceptionally ruthless and amoral.  Many have abandoned the older 
generation’s code of honor, called the “thieves’ code,” in favor of a code of 
“profit by any means.”  Victims and witnesses of Armenian organized crime 
in Los Angeles are so terrified of the criminals in their communities that they 
will not testify to police out of a belief that no one can protect them from the 
retaliation of organized crime.45  ROC groups in the U.S. are a loose network 
of individuals who commit incredible atrocities for material gain.  They are 
not a Mafia to be idolized in films and television shows like the Godfather and 
The Sopranos. 
 
The Evolution of Russian Organized Crime from Stalin to 
Capitalism 
Fordism and the Vory v Zakonye 
People, even those on the fringes of society, are a product of their 
environment.  There are strong similarities between the internal structure of 
Soviet ROC groups and socialist factories, and between the external structure 
of modern ROC and modern capitalist enterprises.  The structure of Russian 
organized crime mimics the economic system in the surrounding environment: 
socialism under the Soviet Union and rabid capitalism under the Russian 
Federation. 
                                                          
45
 Kandel, Jason. (notes 36, 37, 39) 
 25 
A socialist factory was based on two philosophies: Fordism is the most 
efficient model of production and the factory is responsible for the social, 
physical, and financial well being of its workers.  In the 1920s, a cult emerged 
in the Soviet Union among the central planners around the American 
entrepreneur, Henry Ford, and his model of mass production.  This model of 
mass production is called “the theory of Fordism” in modern academic circles.  
The Fordist factory was based on a strict separation of intellectual labor 
(management) and manual labor (shop floor workers).  The theory was that 
workers could produce mass quantities of an identical product by specializing 
in one task; hence the development of the assembly line.46  In America, the 
Fordist factory had a rigid pyramid structure.  A board of directors occupied 
the top rung and was responsible for making the most important financial and 
management decisions and for hiring senior managers in the firm’s factories.  
These senior factory managers were responsible for hiring mid-level 
managers, intellectual laborers (sales representatives, public relations 
personnel, accountants, legal advisors, etc.) and shop floor supervisors.  Shop 
floor supervisors were the intermediaries between the manual laborers and 
high-level managers.  At the bottom of the hierarchy were the production line 
workers who had no decision-making power.   
The socialist factory had a Fordist structure but adhered to the 
philosophy that the factory is the paternal caretaker of the workers.  The 
socialist factory ideally provided for the social, emotional, and physical needs 
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of all employees, intellectual laborers and manual laborers, equally.  The 
communist factory was not only an employer who distributed wages to its 
workers, it was the foundation of the worker’s social community.  The factory 
was involved in every facet of the worker’s life and provided the worker with 
communal housing, recreational outings, childcare, and other needs.47 
Soviet ROC groups had a very similar structure and function to the 
socialist factory.  A professional criminal class first developed in the early 
years of the Soviet Union in Stalin’s gulags.  The hardened criminals sent to 
remote prisons in Siberia and the Russian Far East (RFE) developed a 
community, which still exists today, in their isolated environment based on a 
code of eighteen behaviors and principles, called the “thieves’ code” 
(vorovskoy zakon).48  (For a glossary of criminal terms see Appendix I).  The 
highest echelon of this Russian underworld (vorovskoi mir) are the vory v 
zakonye (thieves in law), criminals who are ceremoniously elected by their 
peers while serving time in prison.49  The vory v zakonye are the criminal 
equivalent of the Fordist board of directors.  The vory meet periodically in a 
criminal assembly (skhodka) to settle territorial disputes, collaborate on 
operations, and decide on matters of policy that affected the entire thieves’ 
world.50  The most famous vor in America is Vyacheslav Ivankov, nicknamed 
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Yaponchik (“Little Japanese”), who reputedly founded the Solntsevskaya 
gang, the largest and most powerful ROC group of the 1990s.51 
Beneath the vory are the pakhan, criminal bosses who run the regional 
gangs of a vor’s operations.  Semion Mogilevich was the pakhan of the 
Solntsevskaya group in Budapest whom the FBI investigated for conducting 
financial crimes against the United States.52  The pakhan is the equivalent of 
the most senior manager in a Fordist factory.  Beneath the pakhan is a 
brigadier who serves as an intermediary between the boss and the “mid-level 
managers.”  There are two types of mid-level managers.  The first type of 
organizes the execution of specific crimes and delegates roles to the lowest 
echelon of the ROC group, the street operators.  The second type will be 
addressed shortly.  The street operators are equivalent to the assembly line 
workers in the Fordist factory.  The street operators—drug dealers, pimps and 
prostitutes, extortionists, enforcers (thugs), burglars—are the actual executors 
of the crime and the backbone of the organization.53   
The second type of managers ensure the security of the organization 
by networking with individuals outside of the criminal organization.  These 
individuals are often members of the legitimate economy—bankers, law 
enforcement officials, journalists, politicians—who work for ROC on the side.  
Connections with the legitimate economy provide ROC with intelligence on 
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law enforcement and rival organizations, political connections and social 
prestige to cover for criminal operations, and legal and financial counsel.  This 
is similar to the prominent role social connections played in the Soviet factory 
to overcome the inefficiencies of central planning.54  (For an organizational 
chart of the vorovskoi mir, thieves’ world, see Appendix II.)  
Membership in the vorovskoi mir entails more than a profession in 
crime.  Like the Soviet factory, every aspect of a criminal’s life revolves 
around the commune of thieves.  All criminal profits are pooled in a joint fund 
called the obshcak and redistributed among the thieves and their families 
according to need.  Thieves are forbidden from holding a legitimate job, all of 
their needs and the needs of their families are provided by the obshcak and the 
assistance of their fellow thieves.55  According to the vorovskoy zakon 
(thieves’ code), though, the commune of thieves’ always takes precedence 
over family obligations. Similar to communism, the thief is expected to accept 
sacrifices for the greater good of the community.  Living under the vory and 
the pakhan (bosses) is not unlike living under the police state of the Soviet 
Union.  The criminal leadership regularly employs spies to ensure the secrecy 
of the organization and adherence to the thieves’ code.56  
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The Wealth of the Soviet Union—Personal Connections 
The Soviet vory cooperated with two other Soviet classes.  The first 
was the nomenklatura (also referred to as apparatchik), elite members of the 
Soviet civil service whose names appeared on the nomenklature (a list of 
Party officials whose loyalty made them eligible for senior posts).57  The 
second class was the tsekhoviki, bosses of Soviet enterprises who participated 
in the shadow economy by producing, selling, and purchasing goods outside 
of the state-mandated production quotas and rations.58  The ineffectiveness of 
central planning and distorted prices made the shadow economy both 
necessary and profitable.  The Soviet economy was an example of the 
inefficiencies of extreme micro-management.  Very senior officials made 
management decisions, i.e. the quantity of nails required to produce 5,000 
shoes, that should have been made by factory bosses.  Thus, the tsekhoviki and 
lower-level managers never knew when or if they would receive the required 
amount of materials to meet production quotas.  As a result, they, along with 
the rest of the population, hoarded.  Hoarding resulted in greater shortages, 
which resulted in an economy of scarcity.  In an economy of scarcity, money 
has no value, but goods and resources, have tremendous value.59   
The vory v zakonye and the tsekhoviki realized they could enhance 
their profit margins by cooperating in acquiring the wealth of Soviet society—
goods and resources.  This relationship was based on informal deal structures.  
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The Soviet economy operated on networks of personal relationships.  
Officially, individuals and enterprises received only the goods and services 
mandated by the state, but since the receipt of goods and services could never 
be guaranteed, individuals had to rely on their personal connections.  The 
most valuable commodity, therefore, was a connection with someone who had 
access to goods and services.  Most often these individuals were civil servants, 
the nomenklatura.60  The vory established connections with the nomenklatura 
in order to obtain political influence and access to goods and resources, but 
more often than not the nomenklatura used their relationships with the vory to 
“steal from the thieves.”  Thus, while the internal structure of the Soviet ROC 
groups was a rigid hierarchy, the external structure was a fluid web of 
personal connections.61   
Privatization and the Theft of the Nation 
In a futile effort at saving the communist economy, President Mikhail 
Gorbachev instituted perestroika from 1985 to the fall of the Soviet Union in 
1991.  Perestroika was an economic and social policy attempt to transform the 
inefficient command economy of the USSR into a decentralized market-
oriented economy.  The nomenklatura, the tsekhoviki, and the vory v zakonye 
amassed power and wealth under perestroika because they were the only 
members of Soviet society with the capital and the connections to take 
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advantage of the economic reforms. When it became clear that the USSR 
would soon implode, the nomenklatura, Communist Party insiders, siphoned 
off Party funds into foreign export-import firms, banks, and trading 
companies.62 
ROC was in an ideal position to exploit privatization when the Soviet 
Union fell in 1991.  Criminals were among the few Russians with hard foreign 
currency, particularly American dollars and Swiss francs, with which to 
purchase state assets.63  ROC groups, along with the nomenklatura and the 
tsekhoviki, were able to purchase state assets for a tenth of their true value in 
insider deals with state officials.64  U.S. policymakers turned a blind eye to the 
theft of the Russian state, choosing to believe that the inheritors of Russia’s 
assets were modern Robber Barons.  U.S. officials imagined that the 
criminals, oligarchs, and nomenklatura were Russian J.P. Morgans who would 
acquire wealth through graft but would eventually contribute to the 
establishment of true capitalism and a stable economy.  This was a pipe 
dream.  The American Robber Barons invested their wealth back into the 
American economy whereas the beneficiaries of Russia’s assets invested their 
wealth in stable foreign financial environments like the United States and 
Western Europe.  Massive capital flight impoverished the Russian state and 
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established conditions that allowed crime, not economic stability and growth, 
to thrive.65  
 
The Transnationalism of Modern Russian Organized Crime 
ROC was confined to the Soviet Union before 1991 because the Iron 
Curtain prevented people and goods from leaving and entering the USSR.  
Thus, the external structure of ROC groups was limited to interactions with 
groups and individuals within the Soviet Union and the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (COMECON) states.  The external structure of an ROC 
group is defined by the group’s relationship with other organized crime 
groups who may be suppliers and buyers, individuals in the shadow economy, 
political connections, and personnel in the legitimate economy.  It includes the 
nomenklatura and the tsekhoviki described in the preceding section.  The 
external structure of a ROC group may be very different from its internal 
structure which is defined by the individuals’ relationships to each other 
within the organization.  ROC groups adapted their external structure to 
globalization and capitalism after the fall of the Iron Curtain.  Globalization is 
responsible for the transformation of the criminal underworld as well as for 
the transformation of the global economy. 
The external structure of modern ROC mimics twenty-first century 
capitalism in the same manner that the internal structure of the vory v zakonye 
mimicked twentieth century communism.  The external structure of modern 
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ROC groups is very similar to that of the hero of modern capitalism—the 
multinational corporation.  The fall of the Iron Curtain led to massive 
emigration from the former Soviet Union to Israel, Western Europe, Cyprus, 
and the United States.66  While the vast majority of these migrants were law-
abiding, ROC exploited the formation of diaspora communities to establish 
foreign bases from which to conduct transnational operations.  In the U.S., 
ROC established a presence in immigrant communities in Brooklyn (Brighton 
Beach), Los Angeles, Newark, Philadelphia, Boston, Miami, and San 
Francisco.67 
ROC groups in diaspora communities maintain ties to their home 
countries but are independent criminal organizations, not cells of larger 
organizations located in the former Soviet Union.  Multinational corporations 
go through a similar process when they establish or purchase subsidiaries in a 
foreign country.  A foreign subsidiary may consist of only a few employees 
from the parent company who assimilate into the local market and form 
connections with local suppliers and buyers.  Armed with the most advanced 
technology, these capitalist migrants have the resources of the parent 
organization at their fingertips and the ability to form networks with suppliers 
and buyers all over the world.  These international networks are utilized on an 
ad hoc basis; they are formed when the need arises and dissolve when the 
need is met.   
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For a hypothetical example, take the case of an Austrian construction 
firm purchased by an American developer.  The Austrian firm maintains a 
great deal of autonomy, but has access to the resources of the larger parent 
company.  One day, the Austrian firm wins a bid for a large contract with the 
city of Vienna that could not have been acquired without the financial backing 
of the American developer.  The Austrian firm consults the American parent 
company on where to buy construction materials for the Vienna job.  Austrian 
and American personnel fly between Austria and America for meetings and 
all over the world visiting potential suppliers.  The Austrian firm decides to 
buy steel from Canada, lumber from Russia, and gypsum from Spain.  The 
firm employs Turkish immigrant labor on the construction project and the 
American developer finances the project with loans from a Japanese bank.  
Once the project is concluded, the formal business relationships between the 
Austrian firm, the international suppliers, laborers, and financiers ends, but the 
personal networks established endure.  When the need arises again, a business 
relationship can be resurrected with the composition of an e-mail and a wire-
transfer. 
ROC groups operate like this hypothetical Austrian firm.  The 
Solntsevskaya group, the largest ROC syndicate, is an excellent example of a 
multinational criminal enterprise.  The Solntsevskaya group is based in 
Moscow and was established in 1980 by Vyacheslav Ivankov.68  The 
Solntsevskaya group began extending itself internationally following the fall 
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of the Iron Curtain.  The group established bases, comparable to the 
subsidiaries of a multinational corporation, in London, Vienna, Canada, 
Brooklyn, Lombardy, and Budapest.  The Solntsevskaya are involved in a 
variety of crimes including money laundering, weapons trafficking, narcotics, 
extortion, and securities fraud.  Like a multinational firm, the Solntsevskaya 
group selected its regional branches and the types of crimes to be executed 
there based on supply and demand.69  Budapest, the largest branch, was 
chosen by boss Semion Mogilevich because it had a stable sophisticated 
banking system and access to Western countries.  Mogilevich decided to 
conduct financial crimes, and not narcotics trafficking, because of Budapest’s 
plentiful supply of financial institutions.70   
Solntsevskaya-Moscow (“the parent company”), on the other hand, 
had the resources and the markets to conduct narcotics trafficking.  
Solntsevskaya-Moscow recognized that there was a substantial demand for 
drugs in Russia and that the organization could utilize its regional bases to 
distribute drugs in Europe where prices were higher.  Solntsevskaya-Moscow 
then identified two narcotics suppliers, Colombian cocaine traffickers and 
Afghan heroin traffickers.  It identified a transportation supplier, the defunct 
Russian merchant marine, which had the vessels and the crews to transport 
cocaine from Latin America to Russia.  It identified corrupt customs officials 
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who would allow illegal shipments into Russia.71  The networks established 
by the Solntsevskaya-Moscow group were for the specific purpose of 
trafficking cocaine and heroine.  As soon as this operation ended, 
Solntsevskaya’s relationship with the Colombian drug cartels, Afghan 
traffickers, the Russian merchant marine, and the corrupt customs officials 
ended as well.  These connections could be resurrected at a later date if they 
proved useful to the execution of another crime.  (For a diagram of the 
Solntsevskaya network used in this example see Appendix III.) 
 
The Internal Structure of Modern Russian Organized Crime 
ROC groups have changed their internal structure in response to 
globalization to different degrees depending on the environment in which they 
operate.  ROC groups in Russia’s lawless periphery maintain a very 
hierarchical internal structure based on a strict division of labor while 
Armenian organized crime groups in Los Angeles have adopted a flat, shifting 
network.  In the first case, ROC operates with a great deal of freedom.  The 
central government is very weak in Russia’s periphery generating a political 
power vacuum filled by ROC.  Law enforcement in the periphery is corrupt 
and lacks resources.  The laws enforced by police were created under 
communism and have not been adapted to capitalism.  In the second case, 
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Armenian organized crime groups are forced to operate in the shadows under 
constant attack by law enforcement.  Local police employ very sophisticated 
law enforcement techniques in comparison to the Russian periphery, 
organized crime is unable to corrupt a substantial number of government 
officials, and the legal system is powerful and comprehensive. 
Hierarchical ROC structures are suited to environments where there is 
a complete breakdown of law and order and a power vacuum left by a weak 
government.  A hierarchical ROC group is a bureaucracy.  It is an institution 
just like a government that is stable and transferable to changing leadership.  
Hierarchical structures fail in law and order societies, though, because of their 
bureaucratic inflexibility.  A ROC group that is forced underground must be 
able to quickly adapt to avoid capture.  A network is more suitable to this 
situation because information is compartmentalized, thus ensuring the security 
of the organization if a component is compromised.  Any evidence gathered 
by law enforcement is obsolete as soon as it is collected because the structure 
of the organization is in a constant state of flux.  
Armenian organized crime (OC) in Los Angeles is an example of an 
ROC group with an internal network structure.  Armenian OC groups in Los 
Angeles are usually less than 10 people and are composed primarily of men 
from 20 to 40 years of age.  There is a small hierarchical element.  Bosses 
form the network by calling together those individuals with known expertise 
in criminal fields desired for a specific operation.  The group is a very 
cohesive unit during the execution of the crime, but disbands after completion 
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of the operation.  The group may form again at a later date with modified 
membership for another assignment.72    
Although, Armenian OC groups in Los Angeles are very fluid, 
membership is hardly arbitrary. Trust is essential to those involved in a 
criminal endeavor.  Each member must be sure that his “colleagues” are 
professionals, will maintain the secrecy of the organization, will not defect to 
law enforcement, and will not cheat the group of its profits.  Criminals, like 
most individuals, are more likely to trust members of their ethnic group and 
members of their community.  The Armenian community in Los Angeles is 
small and close-knit.  Armenian criminals tend to run in the same social and 
family circles providing a foundation of trust.  This does not mean, however, 
that Armenian OC groups will not employ outsiders.  As long as trust can be 
established, Armenian OC groups will seek out those with the highest degree 
of expertise.  In Los Angeles, this is expressed in ad hoc partnerships between 
Armenian OC groups and powerful Hispanic gangs.73 
Armenian OC bosses are different from Italian Mafia godfathers in 
their affinity for anonymity.  Italian bosses flaunt their wealth through 
conspicuous consumption (mansions, expensive clothing and cars) and enjoy 
the notoriety of being in the Mob.  Armenian bosses, on the other hand, do not 
advertise their wealth or their association with crime.  They live in the 
shadows and carefully cover up their involvement in crimes committed by 
street operators.  Anonymity has protected the Armenian bosses and hidden 
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their identity from law enforcement.  While it is relatively easy for police to 
apprehend low-level criminals, these street operators rarely have useful 
information on the activities and membership of the criminal syndicate.  Street 
operators may not even be privy to who is in charge.  There are several 
different Armenian bosses who may be calling the shots in a given week.  
This additional layer of fluidity is designed to make it difficult for law 
enforcement to decipher the structure of the criminal organization.74  (For an 
organizational chart on the structure of Armenian OC see Appendix IV.)  
 
What Does Future Russian Organized Crime Look Like? 
The evidence presented above suggests that the external and internal 
structures of Russian organized crime will continued to adapt to the 
surrounding environment.  Since globalization is unlikely to reverse, the 
external structure of organized crime will become flatter, more international, 
and more flexible.  The internal structures of ROC groups depend on the 
socio-political evolution of the states in which they reside.  If the central 
government of Russia grows weaker, plunging Russia’s periphery into a 
greater state of chaos, ROC will expand its hierarchical structure in the 
regions.  The ROC bureaucracies will fulfill functions ordinarily met by 
regional governments: maintaining order (governing unorganized criminals), 
taxation (protection fees), controlling business-market entry (intimidation), 




and providing social services (with the intent to gain popular support).75  If 
law and order is reestablished in Russia, ROC will be forced underground like 
Armenian OC in Los Angeles.  The internal structure of ROC groups will 
become flatter and more fluid.  Law enforcement in the West is adept at 
combating traditional hierarchical organized crime groups, but a 
comprehensive strategy to combat transnational networks has not been 
established.  This is the new challenge of modern law enforcement, one that 




The Way Ahead 
Important Principles 
Russian organized crime is a significant threat to the security of the 
U.S. financial sector, domestic law and order, foreign investment, military 
operations, and most importantly, national security.  The Clinton 
administration turned a blind eye to crime and corruption in Russia in the 
1990s.  The administration justified its inaction with professions of faith in the 
power of democracy and justice.  It warned of the consequences of upsetting 
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Russia, a valuable ally and the world’s second largest nuclear power.76  Fritz 
Ermarth, a former CIA and National Security Council (NSC) official, stated in 
his Congressional testimony that thanks to this “do nothing” approach, 
security relations between the United States and Russia are in worse shape 
today than they were in December 1991.77 
“Do nothing” is not an option.  U.S. interests are harmed by ROC and 
the states of the former Soviet Union cannot contain ROC without outside 
intervention.  Before examining what options are available, there are five 
essential principles that must be present in any U.S. policy on ROC.  First, the 
U.S. must avoid the perils of cultural arrogance that led to the disaster of 
“shock therapy.”  Policymakers often forget that the most qualified experts on 
Russian organized crime are Russians, not Washington analysts.  This is 
particularly true for modern ROC groups that change faster than law 
enforcement can identify group members.  Individuals who live in 
communities dominated by ROC, either in the former Soviet Union or in 
diasporas abroad, are often very knowledgeable about the operations and 
structure of ROC groups in their neighborhoods.  These individuals have a 
good sense of which policy solutions are viable and which are futile.  They are 
often, though, the last ones to be consulted, if they are consulted at all. 
 Second, all countries, including the United States, must relinquish 
some degree of sovereignty in order to address the threat of ROC.  ROC 
groups, like terrorist organizations, do not abide by state boundaries.  On the 
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contrary, ROC groups exploit the lack of cooperation between states and 
target states that do not have extradition treaties or diplomatic relations with 
one another.78  To effectively combat transnational organized crime, states 
must fulfill reasonable requests by other nations, even unfriendly nations, for 
law enforcement related information and assistance.  Sovereignty is constantly 
violated by the actions of transnational organized crime groups.  
Relinquishing some of this sovereignty to more effectively suppress organized 
crime, is in retrospect, a reasonable sacrifice to make.  Sovereignty 
infringements are easier to bear when committed by a coalition of states than 
by a unilateral actor.  Ideally, a U.S. policy on ROC should be part of an 
international effort.  International support will reduce the resource burden of 
containing ROC and improve international opinion of the U.S. by 
demonstrating that American supports multilateral action.      
Third, U.S. policymakers must accept that ROC does not exist in a 
vacuum.  ROC and other transnational threats like terrorism, WMD 
proliferation, and despotism are inextricably linked to one another.  Organized 
crime thrives in weak states and post-conflict zones.  Organized crime has 
prolonged conflicts in the Balkans, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Africa, and Latin 
America, making unstable situations even more volatile and preventing new 
governments from establishing control over their territories.  The relationship 
between ROC groups engaged in arms trafficking and Colombian cartels 
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exemplifies how ROC can have multiple detrimental effects on the long-term 
interests of the United States.  ROC groups, like the Solntsevskaya syndicate, 
smuggle weapons acquired from Russia’s failing military industrial complex 
to Latin America.  The arms are sold to guerilla forces in exchange for 
Colombian cocaine that can be sold for lucrative prices in Russian and 
European markets.79  This exchange has four obvious effects on U.S. interests.  
It proliferates illegal arms, increasing the chance that terrorist groups, or other 
groups that wish to harm the United States, will be better equipped to do so.  It 
increases the strength of Colombian insurgents providing them with the funds 
and weaponry to overthrow the weak Colombian government and 
destabilizing the region.  It increases global narcotics trafficking, exacerbating 
the drug epidemic in the U.S. and allied nations.  Finally, it strengthens ROC 
weakening the Russian government and destabilizing the world’s second 
largest nuclear power. 
Fourth, any U.S. policy on ROC must be sustainable and have a long-
term strategy.  The causes of ROC are complex societal ills that require efforts 
by generations of policymakers to have a substantial impact.  These causes 
include but are not limited to: poor economic conditions, a weak central 
government, rampant corruption, secessionist movements in the Caucuses, 
and a lack of justice system infrastructure.  A U.S. policy that addresses the 
operational capabilities of ROC without addressing the root causes of crime 
will, at the most, temporarily force ROC groups underground.  As organized 
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crime decreases in political importance, ROC groups will build up their 
operational capabilities. 
Fifth, a ROC policy must propose solutions at the local, national, and 
international levels.  Transnational crime operates internationally, but occurs 
in a locality.  Thus, police officers in Glendale, California are asked to 
become instant experts on Armenia when Armenian organized crime appears 
in their jurisdictions.  In an increasingly globalized world, the distinctions 
between local, national, and international are becoming increasingly blurred.  
However, governments are organized according to these bureaucratic 
classifications and policies must abide by them as well.  The following section 
will suggest policy recommendations for the local, national, and international 
levels.   
 
Local Solutions  
Organized crime task forces in police departments across the United 
States have been stripped of their funding and their staff because of the 
priority placed on counterterrorism.80  While this may seem like a prudent 
decision in the short-term, it is a dangerous long-term strategy.  Russian 
organized crime is adept at infiltrating the legitimate economy and 
government institutions, and very difficult to remove after the fact.  Stripping 
organized crime task forces of their already meager resources would give 
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ROC groups a window of opportunity to firmly establish themselves in our 
financial institutions, our businesses, and our legislatures.   
The redistribution of organized crime resources to counterterrorism 
units would be fruitless because the War on Terror cannot be won without 
addressing the link between organized crime and terrorism.  Organized crime 
groups support terrorists by providing them with false travel documents, 
access to smuggling networks, financial support, and the materials to produce 
WMDs.81  Terrorism and organized crime differ in their ultimate goals but are 
very similar in the methods used to accomplish those goals.82  Thus, local 
police departments would benefit from integrating counterterrorism and 
organized crime units to a degree.  At a minimum, organized crime and 
counterterrorism units should be physically adjacent to one another in local 
police departments so officers from each of these units can easily share 
information that may be relevant to each other’s investigations.  Ideally, both 
units would have access to the same resources and personnel, enhancing 
cooperation between the units.  This does not mean that the current budget for 
counterterrorism operations should be expected to fund both counterterrorism 
and organized crime investigations.  The resources currently allocated to local 
police departments are inadequate to fund both types of investigations, a 
problem that can only be solved by increased funding, not integration.   
Along with increased funding is the need for improved technological 
resources in local police departments.  In 1998, Louis Freeh, former director 
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of the FBI, stated in his Congressional testimony, “Encryption has become the 
most important technology issue confronting law enforcement. Widespread 
use of robust non-recoverable encryption is beginning to devastate our ability 
to fight crime and terrorism.”83  Traditional law enforcement techniques—
telephone tracing and tapping, bugging, electronic surveillance—are no longer 
effective against technologically superior organized crime groups.  Without a 
substantial investment in advanced equipment, technical experts, and technical 
training for officers, local law enforcement will always be one step behind 
ROC.   
In addition to technical training, language studies and cultural studies 
should be a fundamental part of law enforcement training.  The Los Angeles 
police department is often unable to move forward on Armenian organized 
crime investigations because few officers speak Armenian and are familiar 
with the Armenian culture.  This knowledge gap makes it very difficult for 
officers to interview witnesses and victims, interrogate suspects, and gain the 
trust of the Armenian community.84  The Los Angeles police department 
would benefit from actively recruiting officers of Armenian descent in order 
to establish a rapport with the community and weaken the hold of Armenian 
organized crime over the Armenian diaspora.   
Finally, local police departments would benefit from personnel 
exchanges with states where local organized crime groups originate.  Los 
Angeles police officers would have less difficulty obtaining an extradition 
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request from Armenia if one of their own was stationed in an Armenian police 
department.  Personnel exchanges could also assist American officers 
establish a firm link between Armenian organized crime groups in Los 
Angeles and organized crime groups in other states of the former Soviet 
Union.85  Law enforcement investigations are time-sensitive and require an 
immediate response to inquiries.  Communication between police in Los 
Angeles and Armenia would be more efficient if a veteran officer from the 
Los Angeles police department was assigned to Armenia as a liaison between 
the two countries.  While this recommendation is in the realm of possibility, 
there are two difficulties with its enactment.  First, the U.S. State Department 
would have to fund and supervise (through the International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement Bureau) international exchanges between local police 
departments.  Second, local police departments would have to compete with 




As the War on Terrorism demonstrated, getting an issue on the public 
agenda is half the battle to devising and implementing a successful strategy.  
The other half of the battle is keeping the issue on the public agenda.  One 
way to accomplish this is to establish permanent institutions within the federal 
government tasked with addressing that issue.  For example, terrorism will be 




a political priority long after public concern has waned because of the mass 
restructuring of the federal government as a result of 9/11.  Part of this 
restructuring was the establishment of the National Counterterrorism Center 
(NCTC), per recommendation by the 9/11 Commission, under the supervision 
of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).  The NCTC is responsible for 
joint operational planning and joint intelligence analysis of terrorist threats.  It 
is staffed by personnel from the various intelligence and law enforcement 
agencies.   
The 9/11 Commission also allowed for the creation of other National 
Intelligence Centers with topical or regional concentrations.86  The 
establishment of a National Organized Crime Center (NOCC) would enhance 
communication and cooperation among agencies concerned with organized 
crime.  The NOCC would be responsible for the final analysis and threat 
assessment of transnational organized crime groups.  It would task collection 
requirements to the various intelligence agencies and track the progress of 
ongoing operations against significant organized crime threats.  Finally, it 
would ensure the addition of information on organized crime threats into the 
institutional memory of the U.S. government.87  Similar to the integration of 
counterterrorism and organized crime units in local police departments, the 
NCTC and the NOCC should be in the same physical space or in adjacent 
buildings in order to enhance information sharing between the two agencies.    
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Organized crime is not only an integral part to the War on Terrorism, it 
also has a profound impact on U.S. military peacekeeping and nation building 
operations.  Organized crime thrives in failed states, post-conflict zones, and 
remote areas pro-longing or preventing recovery.88  U.S. peacekeeping 
operations in the Balkans are a case in point.  According to General Meigs, 
former commander of the multination Stabilization Force in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the U.S. military was aware of organized crime’s involvement 
in gunrunning operations and other activities in support of combatants in the 
Balkans.   Headquarters, though, was very concerned about mission creep, 
because of the Vietnam experience, and did not want to get the U.S. military 
involved in law enforcement operations.89  Organized crime has an increasing 
role in modern irregular warfare that cannot be ignored.  Thus, there must be a 
new definition of combatants that includes criminal warlords who provide 
material and logistical support to insurgents.   
The military is also a valuable resource to law enforcement agencies 
combating organized crime originating from post-conflict zones where there is 
a U.S. military presence.  U.S. soldiers on the ground have a wealth of 
information on criminal networks and local crime bosses that cannot be 
obtained by law enforcement agencies in the United States.  Thus, both the 
U.S. military and law enforcement would benefit from having military 
representation on organized crime task forces.  
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International Solutions 
ROC is a phenomenon whose root causes originate in the states of the 
former Soviet Union, but whose effects are exported across the globe.  If the 
root causes are not addressed, law enforcement will only limit the operational 
capabilities of ROC without eliminating the threat.  Thus, an ad hoc coalition 
of states affected by ROC should be formed to address the root causes of 
crime in the former Soviet Union.  This ad hoc coalition would be very similar 
to the coalition of states formed to address the opium epidemic in Afghanistan 
and would focus on three primary areas: enhancing police capabilities, 
alternative development, and public diplomacy. 
There are areas of the former Soviet Union, such as the Russian Far 
East, Siberia, the southern Caucuses, and the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia, where 
the local police are merely a figurehead of law and order.  The capabilities of 
local law enforcement must be enhanced in order to weaken ROC’s monopoly 
of power in the lawless peripheries of the former Soviet Union.  One method 
of accomplishing this is the establishment of local training facilities based on 
the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Budapest.   
The Budapest ILEA is run by the FBI and staffed by instructors from 
thirteen U.S. federal agencies, Ireland, Germany, Italy, the U.K., Canada, 
Russia, Interpol, and the Council of Europe.  Funding comes from the 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau (INL) in the U.S. 
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Department of State.90  The ILEA instructs mid-level federal law enforcement 
officials from 25 states in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe on 
leadership, management techniques, human rights, and investigative skills.91  
There are four major disadvantages to the ILEA.  First, it trains national law 
enforcement officers, who are useless in regions where the central government 
has little control.  Second, the ILEA has a multinational student body and 
cannot tailor instruction to the specific conditions of each state.  Third, the 
ILEA trains managers, not street practitioners and there is no guarantee that 
supervisors’ orders will be headed in corrupt law enforcement agencies.  
Fourth, the ILEA does not provide funding to law enforcement agencies 
participating in the program so that they can implement the lessons learned at 
the ILEA in their home countries.   
Local training facilities, in contrast to the Budapest ILEA, will be 
located in cities across the former Soviet Union with ROC epidemics.  Local 
police departments will select their best officers to attend the training 
programs and students will be vetted by facility staff to ensure that corrupt 
officers are kept out of the program.  The training facility will provide funding 
to participating police departments so that they can pay their officers, 
purchase vehicles, and expand police facilities.  The use of all funding will be 
monitored line item by line item so funds are not misappropriated like the 
IMF loans.  Modeling the ILEA, local training facilities will have a 
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multinational staff of instructors to help forge relationships between law 
enforcement agencies in states with a significant ROC problem.  For instance, 
a local training facility in Vladivostok staffed by officers from Brooklyn, the 
Israel Police Force, FBI, and the Hungarian National Police will enhance 
communication and information sharieng between law enforcement agencies 
in Vladivostok, New York, Israel, Hungary, and Washington, D.C.  An 
obstacle to establishing local training facilities is the need for substantial 
political buy-in from government officials in local government and the 
Kremlin, many of whom are in collusion with ROC and benefit from the 
status quo.  To overcome this obstacle, the coalition of states operating the 
training facilities will have to provide incentives, such as foreign direct 
investment, to the Russian government and emphasize the political capital that 
can be gained by pursuing anti-crime policies.   
 Law enforcement alone cannot weaken the hold of ROC on the 
populations of the former Soviet Union.  The proposed ad hoc coalition of 
states must also provide legitimate sources of income to people who live in an 
environment dominated by black and shadow economies.  Aspiring 
entrepreneurs in the former Soviet Union have limited means of obtaining 
legitimate capital with which to start new businesses.  ROC dominates the 
financial sector and controls nearly half of Russia’s banks.92  The coalition of 
states should establish a fund to supply aspiring entrepreneurs with micro-
credit loans.  Relief International, a reputable NGO, implemented a similar 
project in Afghanistan to assist farmers’ abandonment of poppy cultivation for 
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legitimate crops through funding by the International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Bureau.93  An NGO like Relief International, with experience in 
alternative development, should provide micro-credit loans in the former 
Soviet Union with extensive supervision by the ad hoc coalition of states.  
Applicants for micro-credit loans and NGO staff must be vetted to ensure that 
funds are not misappropriated by corrupt individuals.      
 Local NGOs can also be employed in the formation of business 
associations and cooperatives in the former Soviet Union to counter ROCs 
monopoly on local industry.  Cooperatives were vehemently discouraged 
during the era of “shock therapy” because they maintained the connotation of 
forced collectivization.  However, in a hostile environment like the former 
Soviet Union, cooperatives provide support to businesses that are too weak to 
oppose ROC on their own.  Cooperatives have been successful in other parts 
of the former Soviet Union, like Eastern Germany, in helping populations 
with a socialist past adapt to capitalism.94  To prevent the infiltration of 
corruption and ROC fronts, cooperative and business association members 
should be vetted and required to submit to an audit.  Cooperatives and 
business associations will no doubt face intimidation by ROC which is why 
the enhancement of law enforcement capabilities must go hand in hand with 
alternative development.   
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Public diplomacy, one of the more important features of any foreign 
policy, is an often neglected method for combating transnational threats like 
ROC.  Post-socialist populations are disillusioned with democracy and 
capitalism because of the failure of both Western and Eastern governments to 
live up to the promises of privatization.  Most citizens in post-socialist states 
associate democracy and capitalism with the theft of state assets and the 
domination of the economy by oligarchs and organized criminals.  The West 
is commonly blamed for this breakdown in law and order.95  Apathy fuels 
ROC because criminals are permitted to move freely among the population.  
A strong public diplomacy campaign by an ad hoc coalition of states will help 
reduce popular apathy to crime and weaken ROC.   
A public diplomacy campaign should address three goals.  First, the 
campaign should encourage support of genuine anti-crime politicians in the 
former Soviet Union.  The few public figures in Russia that have openly 
supported actions against ROC, did so with great risk to themselves and their 
families, many met unfortunate ends.  Galina Starovoitova, an outspoken 
parliamentary deputy in favor of democracy and reform, nicknamed the 
“conscience of Russia,” was fatally shot outside of her home in St. Petersburg 
in 1998.96  General Lev Rokhlin, a strong opponent of crime and corruption in 
Russia’s military, was fatally shot outside of his apartment a few days before 
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Starovoitova.97  More recently, Viktor Yushchenko, the pro-West and pro-
reform Ukrainian President, was severely disfigured during the 2004 
presidential elections by a poisoning attempt.98  Mass public support may help 
encourage a few brave politicians to oppose ROC despite the inherent risks.  
Congressman Spencer Bachus once said that the most important thing that 
Russia needs during this time of rampant crime and corruption is a Moses, a 
strong leader to heal the wounds of privatization.99  The U.S. must foster 
public support to the modern Moseses of the former Soviet Union.  
Second, a public diplomacy campaign should encourage popular 
hostility towards ROC and support for genuine democracy and capitalism.  
The campaign should explain the difference between genuine democracy and 
capitalism, and the crony-capitalism that has become the norm in the former 
Soviet Union.  The ideal solution to crime and corruption is one generated and 
demanded by the people.  Those affected by ROC know what is best for them 
and how to solve it, but may lack the will, the information, or the resources to 
do so.  A public diplomacy campaign can provide the will and the 
information, while the other reforms detailed earlier in this paper must provide 
the resources.     
Third, a public diplomacy campaign should encourage support of the 
United States and the West by advertising U.S. efforts to combat ROC.  Most 
people from the former Soviet Union, blame the West, particularly the United 
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States, for the failures of privatization and the emergence of kleptocracies.100  
Russia’s foreign policies, and those of the rest of the former Soviet Union, 
reflect this popular hostility and harm U.S. interests abroad and at home.  The 
inherent difficulty in implementing a public diplomacy campaign is state 
control over the media.  In the event that the Kremlin refuses to broadcast 
anti-crime and pro-democracy messages, alternative media, such as RadioFree 
Europe, should be utilized.   
In addition to establishing an ad hoc coalition of states, other methods 
of enhancing international cooperation to combat ROC should be pursued.  
One such method is enhancing ROC’s political priority in the International 
Criminal Police Organization (Interpol).  Interpol is an international 
government organization that assists law enforcement agencies in 182 
member states communicate and cooperate with one another.  Every member 
state has a National Central Bureau (NCB), operated by national law 
enforcement officers, responsible for communicating information sent through 
Interpol to national law enforcement agencies.  There are five regional 
bureaus—three in Africa (Zimbabwe, Kenya, and Cote D’Ivoire) and two in 
Latin America (Argentina and El Salvador)—and one liaison office in 
Thailand responsible for addressing regional crime issues and fostering 
cooperation between states within the region.101   
A sixth Interpol regional bureau should be established in Budapest to 
coordinate international law enforcement operations against ROC and develop 
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a firm understanding of ROC’s transnational operations.  Budapest would be 
an appropriate location for a regional bureau because of the Budapest ILEA 
and Hungary’s physical location between Western Europe, a destination for 
ROC, and Russia, the origin of ROC.  Funding for the Budapest regional 
bureau would come from wealthy states affected by ROC.  The U.S., the U.K., 
Austria, and Canada are likely donors.   
 
Concluding Remarks 
The recommendations detailed above are only a brief introduction to 
the broad array of options available to U.S. policymakers for addressing the 
threat of ROC.  The most disturbing discovery of this thesis has not been the 
strength of ROC groups or the cruelty with which they operate, though this 
has been shocking, it is the lack of urgency with which policymakers 
approach ROC.  Transnational organized crime, along with transnational 
terrorism, will be one of the most significant threats facing nation-states in the 
twenty-first century.  This threat is compounded by the fact that transnational 
organized crime and terrorism are intertwined and complimentary.  They 
should not and cannot be seen as completely separate phenomena.  Often, 
organized crime and terrorism are different manifestations of the same core 
problems: poverty, war, instability, lack of alternative livelihoods, weak 
governance, and disillusionment.   
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When transnational organized crime gains strength, the resources and 
capabilities of terrorist organizations gain strength as well.  Thus, shifting 
resources away from programs that address organized crime threats to 
programs that address counterterrorism will only exacerbate both problems.  
In the short-term, terrorist capabilities will be reduced, but in the meantime 
organized crime capabilities will be enhanced and merged with legitimate 
sectors of the economy and government.  The long-term capabilities of 
terrorist organizations will thus be enhanced by the materialization of a 
stronger, more resilient partner.  There is a temptation to pour all of the 
nation’s resources into the most politically pressing issue of the moment at 
great peril of exposing oneself to other threats.  The U.S. government must 
avoid the temptation to pour all of its resources into the War on Terrorism 
thereby exposing itself to the infiltration of organized crime.      
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Appendices/Lists of Illustrations 
Appendix I: Glossary of Terms 
Excerpts taken from Comrade Criminal by Stephen Handelman102 
 
 
Apparat The name denoting the entire civil service during the 
 Soviet era (The elite membership of the apparat was 
 known as the nomenklatura—see below.) 
 
Apparatchik A member of the Soviet civil service.  Also often used  
 indiscriminately to cover nomenklatura as well. 
 
Brodyagi A criminal caste below vor, vagabonds; (leaders-in- 
 training). 
 
Mafiya A generic term used across the Soviet Union since the  
 1970s to denote Party barons accused of corruption,  
 black market speculators or sometimes just sections of  
 society the speaker did not happen to like.  By 1992, it  
 carried an additional meaning to describe the groups of  
 criminal entrepreneurs and corrupt officials who came  
 to prominence in the post-Soviet era. 
 
Nomenklatura The elite membership of the Soviet governing system,  
 so called because their names appear on the  
 nomenklature or list of the most loyal Party officials  
 eligible for senior posts at home and overseas. 
 
Obshcak Criminal treasury. 
 
Pakhan Chief of band; crime boss. 
 
Perestroika103 An economic and social policy implemented by  
 President Mikhail Gorbachev from 1985 to the fall of  
 the Soviet Union in an attempt to transform the  
 inefficient command economy of the USSR into a  
 decentralized market-oriented economy. 
 
Podkhod Coronation of vor; literally approach. 
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 Handelman, Stephen. (note 57) 
103
 Finckenauer, James O., and Yuri A. Voronin. (notes 5, 8-11, 18-20, 22, 27, 28, 49, 58, 61, 
62, 64, 75, 95, 100) 
 v 
Skhodka Criminal assembly/council of vory. 
 
Tsekhovik/ Owner of black-market underground factories. 
Tsekhoviki 
 
Vor Thief, lord of crime.  Once generic term for thief or  
 foreign enemy. 
 
Vor v Zakonye Thief in law.  Full name of leader of old Russian gang. 
 
Vorovskoy Zakon104 The thieves’ code.  A list of eighteen codes that all vory  
 are obliged to live by and defend. 
 
Vorovskoe Blago Criminal welfare.  What every vor must defend. 
 
Vorovskoi Mir Thieves world. 
                                                          
104
 State of California. Office of the Attorney General. (notes 48, 53, 55, 56) 
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Appendix II: Organizational Chart of The Vorovskoi Mir (The 
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NETWORK OF CRIMINALS AND CORRUPT OFFICIALS 
IN GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY 
* 
*These are members of the legitimate economy and 
not internal members of the criminal organization. 
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Appendix III: External Structure of the Solntsevskaya Group—The 
Network 105
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Appendix IV: Internal Structure of Armenian Organized Crime 
Groups in Los Angeles—The Network with Umbrella Support106  








Street operators—professional criminals who are potential 
recruits 
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Appendix V: Illustrations 
 
The Port of Vladivostok, the Russian Far East.107 
 
Yekaterinburg, the Russian Far East.108 
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Semion Mogilevich, boss of the Budapest branch of the Solntsevskaya 
group.111 
  
Galina Starovoitova, “the conscience of Russia,” assassinated by ROC in 
1998.112 
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